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DuREss
lost, first, because it was based on his physical incompetency as
well as his mental incompetency, and, second, because the same
judge who entered that order sat in the lower court in this suit
and pronounced the grantor mentally competent to convey the
land in question; that it would not disturb the finding of the
lower court, "that the deed in controversy was the free and voluntary act of a capable mind," and that, therefore, the deed was
good and valid and it conveyed the title of the grantor to the apJoHN IJ. Wn Ams.
pellee.
DURESS
A. IN GENERAL. Duress may be defined as an unlawful
restraint, intimidation, or compulsion of another to such extent
and degree as to induce such person to do or perform some act
which he is not legally bound to do, contrary to his will and inclinations.
If a person's hand be taken forcibly and compelled to hold
a pen and write, it cannot be said that the writing is his own act
since there is no will of his own used, his free agency is destroyed, and this act would be absolutely void. But where an
act is forced by threats of violence, it is unsound to contend that
the act done is not the act of the person threatened; in fact the
person threatened consents to do the act rather than submit to
the violence threatened. It is well settled that when the socalled duress consists only of threats, and such threats do not
reach the heights of such bodily compulsion as turns the threatened party into a mere tool, the contract is only voidable at the
option of the threatened party.
Cases substantiating this modern view of duress are many,
some of which are: Foss v. Hildreth, 10 Allen 26; Lewis v. Bannister, 16 Gray 500; Fischer v. Shattuck, 17 Pick. 252; Clark v.
Pease, 41 N. H. 414, and Fairbanks v. Snow, 13 N. E. 596.
Formerly the common law rule was very stringent in limiting the class of threats which would constitute duress sufficient
for the avoidance of a deed or contract. Duress per minas, for
instance, according to Coke, Blackstone and other authorities,
was confined to fear of loss of life, of loss of member, of mayhem
or imprisonment.
It is obvious that only duress of the gravest kind should
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serve as an excuse for a crime, and, where the act done affects
third parties it seems fair that the compulsion which would be
an excuse for the act must be severe. Nevertheless, as between
the original parties themselves there is no basis or reason for
such a stringent rule. The American view concerning duress
has a much broader application, including less serious personal
wrongs, and the exercise of unlawful control of property, courts
regarding such pressure as sufficient to overcome the will power
of a person of ordinary firmness and constancy of mind.
The theory of this view seems to be, given a threat of improper action and a deed or contract induced by it, there should
be in such cases grounds for avoidance, otherwise the person making the threat will profit by his own wrong. Because of this
view there is a strong inclination on the part of the courts to
disregard the external standard and allow the deed or contract
to be avoided if the alternative be so disagreeable because of the
nature of the individual that it exerts enough pressure on him
sufficient to cause him to submit.
Under all the theories advanced by the courts of every
jurisdiction the courts are universal in holding that the threat
must be improper or there would be no reason for allowing the
defense regardless of the amount of pressure exerted. See
Phillips v. Henry (Pa.), 10 Montg. L. R. 9, 11; Boggs v.
Slack and Greenbrier Grocery Co., 53 W. Va. 536; Morse v.
v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233; Willnars v. Stewart, 115 Ga. 864;
Darling v. Hines, 5 Ind. Appeals 310.
In the case of Wilbur v. Blanchard,126 Pac. 1069, the court
held that the threat of prosecution for a crime in fact committed
constitutes such duress as to justify the avoidance of a contract. Some courts have held that since the prosecution is lawful, no wrong is threatened, and hence the so-called duress would
not be a defense. However, the weight of authority seems to be
with the ease just cited, but on the ground that, although the
alternative threatened, the prosecution itself is not illegal, still
such a use thereof is improper for it would use the machinery of
the criminal law for a purpose for which it was never intended.
B. DEEDS BY DURESS OF WHICH PURCHASER HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE. It is generally held that duress is of no avail
against an innocent obligee. Cases setting forth this principle
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are: Fairbanksv. Snow, 13 N. E. 596; Rogers v. Adams, 66 Ala.
600; Clark v. Pease, 41 N. I. 414; Lane v. Sehlenmer, 114 Ind.
296; Defuty v. Stapleford, 19 Cal. 302.
In Clay v. Clay, a recent case decided by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, and reported in 199 Ky. 49, it was held that a
deed was not avoided by duress of which the purchaser had no
knowledge, that the duress, if any, under which plaintiff executed the deed to her brother who conveyed the property to defendant, cannot defeat defendant's rights if he had no knowledge of that duress whereby plaintiff was induced to join in the
conveyance by the brother to defendant.
It seems that the Kentucky court is in accord with the great
weight of authority on this subject and its decision seems right
on principle, for it would seem unjust to say that threats by a
stranger, made without knowledge or privity of the party, are
good grounds for avoiding a contract induced by such threats.
ASTOR HOGG.

